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l. A Human Rights Revolution
Michael Ignatieff chose to open his Tanner Lecture on Human Values at Princeton in
2000 with a quote from Primo Levi concerning an encounter with Dr. Heinz von
pannwitz, chief of the chemical department at Auschwitz:
That look was not one between two men; and if I had known how
completely to explain the nature of that look, which came as if across the
glass window of an aquarium between two beings who lived in different
worlds, I would also have explained the great insanity ofthe third German
[Reich].'
It was out of the insanity of the Holocaust and the solemn vow of "never again" by the
world community that human rights was manifested on an international level. As an
incredibly dynamic force in twentieth century history, the idea of human rights has
guided the just rule of presidents and dictators alike, has spawned the creation of
numerous governing bodies to oversee the sanctity of human rights, and has been
immortalized in such documents as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
I speak of human rights like it is a creation of twentieth century history, but the origins
of human rights (and human rights' mode of transportation, rights language) can be
traced back thousands of years. Human rights theorists often refer to Antigone, a piece of
Greek literature written in 442 B.C., as one of the incipient writings in the field.
Sophocles narrates the story of Antigone, a woman scorned by her uncle King Creon for
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giving her brother a ritual burial in spite of city law that forbids proper burial of traitors.
Antigone tells the king she must disobey because she must answer to a higher power of
the laws ofjustice ofthe gods than the positive laws of man.
Rather, human rights are distinct in the 20111 century in its international form At no
other time in human history has the concept of human rights taken on such an ecumenical
definition as in the past century.

With the United Nations Universal Declaration of

Human Rights (UDHR), the metaphysical concept of the rights of man became
international law, a move solidified by the passage of such supporting treaties as the 1966
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1966). Nearly every region of the world has some mode of human rights
adjudication; most regional political or economic unions have stipulations for the
protection of human rights. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, holds
jurisdiction over a tremendous area, from the Azores to the easternmost regions of
Russia.
The pinnacle document in support ofhuman rights, however, is the UDHR, passed into
international law by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. The
UDHR specifically denotes thirty articles by which the human rights of all human beings
are to be judged. Some articles, like Articles 1-5, deal with "innate" freedoms of
humankind (for example, the idea that all human beings are born free and equal) as well
as protection ofthe human body against servitude and slavery. Others, such as Article 17,

1
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deal with property rights. Still others, such as Article 23, speak of social and economic
rights.
It is hardly an exaggeration to call this rapid period in human rights development a
human rights revolution. This is definitely a viable declaration when considering the
progression of human rights in the past century. We have gone from a world recognizing
little more than the absolute sovereignty of states to do as they please within their borders
to the belief that every individual within any given society has innate freedoms and rights
specifically enumerated and agreed upon by the world community. This certainly sounds
like a revolution to me.

2. Shortcomings of a Revolution
With such rapid development of human rights law, the natural inclination for someone
not familiar with twentieth century human rights history would be to believe that fewer
atrocities like the ones that convinced the U.N. to pass the UDHR occur in our world.
Unfortunately, the contrary is more true than false. The so-called "Age of Rights" is
sewn with a thread of continuous shortcomings on the part of the world community to
•
uphold human rights language. There have been some wonderful examples of human
rights language producing a greater good, such as with the complete end of apartheid in
South Africa in 1994. However, under the watchful eye of the U.N. and U.S. (and
sometimes in conjunction with the U.S.), the world has again and again been subjected to
the horrors of genocide and mass killing. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin purged tens of
millions in a paranoid attempt to shore up absolute power. In Cambodia, the Khmer
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Rouge regime killed nearly a fifth of the entire population of that country, 1.7 million
people, from 1975-79. Similar pogroms in East Timor and the violent coup d'etat of
Augusto Pinochet resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. In Rwanda, nearly a million
were killed in 100 days in 1994, mostly through the ghastly use of machetes and
primitive tools-turned-weaponry called panga knives. The systematic destruction of
Chechnya continues even today; the lives of at least 60,000 civilians have already been
lost.

3. The problem with universal human rights
While these blatant examples of human rights abuses are terrible, the problem with
universal human rights is in fact much more theoretical, much less "sexy."
The issue is the very nature of the term "universal human rights." The problem is how
to produce one definition that every culture can agree upon. Maurice Cranston gives us
the following definition fi"om his book What Are Human Rights?
A human right is by definition a universal moral right, something which all men,
everywhere, at all times ought to have, something of which no one may be
deprived without a grave affront to justice, something which is owing to every
human being simply because he is human. 2
Cranston in a way borrows his definition for human rights from Immanuel Kant, the
German Enlightenment philosopher and creator of the Categorical Imperative, which

2

Cranston, Maurice. What are Human Rights? Taplinger Publishing, New York: 1973: p. 25
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states roughlY that all human beings must treat themselves and the rest of humanity
aJways as an end, and never a means. Kant believed that by enticing the will of every
rational being to hold sacred the rest of humanity, a universal law is laid down that gives

the right to all humans to live as equals.
The problem with Kant's theory, in terms of finding an agreeable definition for
universal human rights, is its foundation on the ideals of German rationalism. When Kant
is speaking of treating all humans as ends rather than means, he is really speaking of
treating all European humans (perhaps even as narrow as all German humans) as ends. In
other writings, Kant dismisses the idea that other cultures, such as African and
Amerindian cultures, could be part of his theory, calling these people barbarians and nonhumans.
The problem is obvious: universal human rights are viewed by many around the world
as Western human rights, as a clever guise by the West to maintain a semblance of
control on the world. This ''New Imperialism" is described by Michael lgnatieff: who,
explaining the argument of many other regions of the world, says
Human rights is seen as an exercise in the cunning of Western reason: no
longer able to dominate the world through direct imperial rule, Western
reason masks its own will to power in the impartial, universalizing
lanugage of human rights and seeks to impose its own narrow agenda on a
plethora of world cultures that do not actually share the West" conception
of individuality, selfhood, agency, or freedom.3

3
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Universal human rights, for cultural relativists, is meant primarily to subve1t and deny

cu1ttJta1 diversity in exchange for a Western cultural hegemony.

Relativists take special

offense to the idea that all the rights of man can be compacted into thirty articles. The
values of ''the Other" are marginalized, and those values are contested in the West as
being immoral or, in some cases, inhumane.
Our objective as human rights activists, then, is just as obvious. As the political leader
and example for the rest ofthe world, the West (and the United States, in particular) must
change the focus and definition of universal human rights. This new paradigm must
reflect the superiority of the liberal conception of universal human rights on a structural
level while still assuring diversity of world regional influences on the cultural level. To
achieve this, the debate between cultural relativists and supporters of a universal
definition ofhuman rights, of which I am one, must evolve to reflect our changing world.
Much has changed in the past half century, and our definition of universal human rights
must reflect these changes The universality of modernist philosophers like Kant is
incomplete but certainly not incorrect. While Enlightenment philosophers spoke in terms
of Europeans, their ideas can today be applied to the rights of all human beings.. We live
in a postmodern world, and thus human rights debate must become a postmodern debate.
While it seems that postmodernism and universal human rights are antithetical, there is
indeed room for a universal value system in the postmodern world.

4. Why "Universal Human Rights?"

A PIDLOSOPHICAL DEFINITION OF "HUMAN RIGHTS?"

10

Befbre 1 go into a fuller definition of universal human rights, we must ask why there

even are rights that humankind can claim exclusive possession of ,
Intense philosophical debate has gone on for centuries about the nature of the human

person in existence, and whether there exists the metaphysical idea of "human nature"

that other creatures are devoid of. The number of human nature theories presented in the
whole realm of this dialogue rivals the number of philosophers who have participated in

the dialogue; for as long as people have discussed themselves they have debated whether
human nature exists.

Plato believed that all human beings possessed a special

"ingredient," if you will, that set us apart from the wild beasts (and, of course, as he put
it, the uncivilized hordes). It was because of this uniqueness that humans were restricted
from killing, raping and doing generally nasty things to each other. Aristotle believed
that human nature was actualized by fulfillment of each person's human potential; for
each individual this potential was different, but it was this potential that, again, set us
aside from wild beasts (and, again, those hordes).
Conversely, thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and Fredric Nietzsche had very different
ideas about human nature. Both men looked negatively on human beings, whom they
believed lived in a wild and violent state of nature. Hobbes believed life was "solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish and short" and that "every man is enemy to every man."4 Hobbes
certainly did not believe in the uniqueness of humankind amongst the beasts because he
equated us with beasts that kill each other in the name of conquest. Nietzsche went
further by saying that humankind is not only simply another animal, but a particularly

4
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and uniquely nasty animal set apart from beasts in our propensity to inflict tremendous
violence on each other. In essence, any attempt to set human beings apart from animals
will ultimately fail because there is no such distinction.
Contemporary attempts to pinpoint the source of human rights are problematic as well.
A common defense is to define human rights as "needs." Abraham Maslow, creator of

the "hierarchy of needs" states that "it is legitimate and fruitful to regard instinctoid basic
rights ... as needs."5 Needs have even been defined in terms of rights, for instance that
"amount of food, clean water, adequate shelter, access to health services and education
opportunities to which every person is entitled by virtue ofbeing bom6
I am in agreement with Jack Donnelly when he says that such a definition of human
rights is inadequate and perhaps dangerous:
Without a ground in hard empirical science, ' needs' takes on a
metaphorical or moral sense that quickly brings us back to philosophical
wrangles over human nature . .. One might even suggest that it is positively
dangerous to insist that rights are rooted in needs but then be unable to
come up with a list of needs adequate to produce an attractive set of
human rights. 7
The debate, if one tries to equate human rights with needs, will inevitably return to the
"philosophical wrangles" from whence it came.

5

Indeed, it is in the wrangles of

Maslow, Abraham. Motivation and Personality. Harper & Row. New York. 1970: xiii
McHale, John and Magda C. McHale. "Meeting Basic Human Needs" The Annals 442. March 1979: p.
15.
7
Donnelly, Jack. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice Cornell U. Press. Ithaca, NY. 2003 : p.
13-14.
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pbilosophy that the debate must remain, because a definition of "human" rights could
never be empirical.
But we find ourselves upon a paradox; the claim of rights for humankind can only come

from philosophy, but such a claim could never be adequately philosophically justified.
These debates are useful and interesting and should not be disgarded, but in the context of
advancing human rights they are an impediment; no resolution about the validity of

human rights can come of it.
The American pragmatist Richard Rorty

addre~ses

this problem. "There is a growing

willingness," he says, "to neglect the question ' What is our nature?' and to substitute the
question 'What can we make of ourselves?'

We are much less inclined than our

ancestors were to take 'theories of human nature' seriously ... " 8 In another text, he poses
the theory more clearly, saying
The philosophical problems, and the sense of artificiality associated with
these problems, only arise when a handy bit of rhetoric is taken to be a fit
subject for "conceptual analysis," when foci imaginarii are subjected to
close scrutiny - in short, when we start asking about the "nature" of truth
or art or humanity. 9
Perhaps a more practical example is needed. As drivers (those of us with the luxury of
owning automobiles), there is no question what the three colors on a stoplight represent.

In much the same way, there is no question to Rorty that humankind is deserving of
8

Rorty, Richard. ''Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality" in The Politics of Human Rights. The
Belgrade Circle, eds. Verso Publishing. London. 1999: p. 69.
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)luJD8D rights because the entirety of the international community have accepted human

riibts as existing.

"Human rights" only becomes a philosophical problem when over

81]8lysis interferes with the function of the human rights debate. No one looks at a
stoplight and asks, "What is the nature of the yellow light?" In as such, where the world
community accepts the existence of human rights, a debate of the warrant of "human"
rights is both gratuitous and ultimately self-defeating.
THE UNIVERSALITY PROBLEM

On a smaller scale than the philosophical problems with human rights is the question of
universality.

While my proposition is that there are universal human rights (to be

discussed more below), the definition of universality must be clarified.
Problems arise when speaking of a definitive timeline for when the idea of "universal"
human rights was created. Some theorists argue that universality is a creation of liberal
Enlightenment thought, that "the full range of values espoused by the human rights
discourse has always been limited to certain groups of people at certain times." 10 To be
fair, looking at even the past few hundred years, the contemporary blossoming of the idea
of universal human rights seemed virtually non-existent at times. The indecencies of war
and colonization, the institution of slavery and genocide would suggest that universal
human rights has only taken on its present form through international treaties and
declarations such as the UDHR. Anthony Langlois concludes, "Any study of history will

9

Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK. 1999: p.
195.
10
Black, Ian . "Rights for All Still Remain a Dream." Guardian Weekly, J3 Dec. 1998. p. 7
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cleJDOnstfate that there is no necessity about the universality of those values we now name

. Iy and empmca
. . 11y. "
bUIJUlll rights - both normative
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Langlois and Co. are working under the assumption that human rights in their universal
fonn is a creation of liberal Western culture that bas been forced onto the world
community. This assumption will seem incomplete when considering my theory of the
structural level of human rights. 12 As human rights are inalienable and innately in every
human being, the idea that they were somehow created by one society and then posed on
the rest is false. Universal human rights are not a concept created by liberal Western
culture. Instead, they are a concept that has existed as part of the human condition since
time immemorial; liberal Western society did not create universal human rights, it simply
bas recognized them. Universal human rights are not imposed on the world community;
they are and always have been inherent in us all on the conceptual level.

5.

Modernist vs. Postmodern Human Rights Perspectives

As I have discussed already, postmodern human rights must become a more proactive
force in the debate about the existence and role of universal human rights in our world
today.
The main impediment to postmodern universal human rights is the focus of the debate.
I believe that to at least begin to solve the universalist-relativist dichotomy you have to

11

Langois, Anthony. "Human Rights: the globalisation and fragmentation of moral discourse." Review of
International Studies. Vol. 28. 2002: p. 482.
12

For more on my theory of the structural and local levels of human rights, please refer to Chapter 6 ofthis
paper.
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cbaD8e the focus of human rights dialogue. Most postmodernists look at the UDHR as

both 8 huge step forward for human rights law, but also a major obstacle in realizing
human rights around the world. They argue that the UDHR is at its base a modernist
document rife with all the problems that modernism accompanies. Modernist universal
human rights, they contend, finds its foundation in classical liberalism, a mode of thought

that might go over well in Germany, but to the Saudi Arabian or Chinese or West
African, such a foundation would be at best puzzling and at worst insulting.
While postmodernism has it' s drawbacks (to be discussed further later), some merit to
this argument can be fow1d. It was in the overarching realm of a sudden universality that
both China and Saudi Arabia, despite its support of the document, abstained from
ratifying the UDHR. In 1948, the U.N. was comprised of 56 member nations. Today,
there are 191 countries ranging in size from Russia, with a land mass of 6.6 million
square miles and a population of 144.5 million to the tiny Oceanic nation of Nauru,
encompassing an island only eight miles square and housing a modest 12,570 citizens. To
believe that the concept ofhuman rights is completely identical for a Nauruan as it is for
a Russian would be mistaken.
But, postmodernists contend, this is just the assumption that is required in order to be a
true disciple of the Universal Declaration, an assumption most if not all would be hard
pressed to make. Postmodernists view the modernist assumption as a direct product of its
seventeenth century European creator, and view the continuation of this product a result
of the modern Western mind. "The specific history of the concept of [modernist] human

16

JisbtS." muses Anthony Langlois, "is that of the Enlightenment project and contemporary
•t
h ,13
b1Jer8l political phi osop Y·
We are compelled to change our worldview, to reconsider centuries old international
relations dogma and garner all cultures of the world to create a new definition of
universal human rights, lest we wallow in the old definition and solve none of the
problems plaguing human rights debate around the world.

6.

Two Levels of Postmodern Human Rights

Of course, an attempt to define "universal human rights" in a postmodem context must

be done somewhat tongue-in-cheek. I am quite aware of the paradox proposed. The very
idea that there could ever be a complete definition of postmodern human rights goes
against the very idea of postmodernism. To declare as such would create an embarassing
tautology: creating a new rights narrative to replace the modernist human rights
metanarrative we are attempting to debunk.

A professor of mine would call this a

"splendid truth," and then declare, "But I am calling the police."
For this reason, I am resolved to propose a modest and incomplete definition of what
postmodern universal rights are, with the hope that in the future, others can provide
further insight into the subject.
The definition is twofold. The first part would declare that human rights cannot be
discussed simply on the level of "cultures" because the idea of "cultures,"

13
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"coJJ1Illunities," "nations" and "groups" is so tenuous. Rather, we must defme hwnan
rights on two levels.
A. THE STRUCTURAL LEVEL OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
The first is the structural level, which describes the structure through which human
beings achieve human rights. For example, are hwnan rights an "inalienable right" for
every individual simply because we are all humans, or are human rights derived from
some other location? It is on the structural level that universality is applied because it is
only on the structure of human rights, not the idiosyncracies and particulars of each local
group's beliefs, that universality could ever be applied.

All that is demanded by

structural texts is "respect for essential human rights, certain essential freedoms and the
right to self-government. " 14 Through an analysis of the structural level of human rights,
it is my belief that the structure towards human rights present in contemporary liberal
societies is superior to those of other societies because of the structural derivative of
human rights. For this reason I believe that the structure of contemporary liberal human
rights can (and should) be applied universally.

B. THE LOCAL LEVEL OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
The second level is the cultural, or local, level. I use "local" in place of "cultural"
because of the ontological problems with the word "cultural," and because "culture" is
such a tenuous idea. Take, for example, the idea of "Western human rights culture."
Even when factoring in the idea of sub-cultures (ie: "Germans," "Irish," "French," etc.),
for the most part people still lump the whole of Europe and much ofNorth America into

18

"Western" human rights culture. Such a characterization is incomplete; to suggest that
bUIJ1811 rights culture in a nation such as Macedonia is identical to the human rights
culture in England is preposterous. The differences in the respective legal systems and
their application of certain rights to their citizens alone are disparate. Western culture
"includes both Caligula and Marcus Aurelius, Francis of Assisi and Torquemada,
Leopold II and Albert Schweitzer, Jesus and Hitler- and everything in between." 15
Still another example of the incompleteness of the te1m "culture" can be found in India,
where the caste system has broken into a complex system of thousands of subcastes. For
example, the anthropologist Miriam Sharma identified sixteen separate castes in a village
in northern India of only 144 households. 16 Each Indian caste represents a different
identification of what Indian culture is, leaving us with no clear idea of what "Indian
culture" as a whole could be.
In the chapter entitled "Rights as Rites: The Confucian Alternative" (pgs. 199-216)
from his book Human Rights in the World Religions, Roger Ames attempts to define
"Chinese culture" while dedicating just a few delicate mentions of Chinese events past
1949.

17

To disregard the rule of the Communist dictatorship of the past half-century as

having affect on Chinese culture is a silly farce; Chinese "culture," like that in Europe
and India, is complex and cannot be seen as monolithic.

14
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The local level is the level of culture-specific implementation. In this instance, when
speaking of"culture" I refer to the customs and tendencies of societies around the world.
While all humankind is connected on the structural level, on the local level we are all
differentiated by the mode of implementation of human rights standards.
Locality can take on many different forms. It can mean a national identity, but should
not be limited as such. Locality can be attributed to, as Jack Donnelly suggests in his
book Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, level of economic development,
or perhaps to the religion a person associates themselves with. The possibilities for the
different types of localities are as numerous as any can imagine. But the important
implication of a locality is that, in their implementation of human rights, they remain
loyal to the minimums required by the structural level of human rights. The UDHR, for
example, is a document of the structural level ofhuman rights in that it, "states a common
understanding of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights
of all members ofthe human family and constitutes an obligation for the members of the
international community. " 18

It is the purpose of the structural level of human rights to trumpet onto humankind the

moral precepts of human rights. It is the purpose of the local level of human rights to
apply and implement these universal human rights as they see fit into the natural
workings of their society. For human rights to function effectively, these two levels must
work simultaneously and on equal ground to the other. For, while we all live under the
18

"International Human Rights Law" in International Law: Cases and Materials. Damroscb, Lori, Louis
Henkin, et al. eds. 41h edition. West Group Publishing. St. Paul, MN. 2001: 593-94.

guidance of universal human rights, "Cultural diversity deserves om respect. .. because it
is the autonomous choices of the rights-holding individuals."
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In this manner, an

usurpation of the local level of human rights by the structural would effectively destroy
the influence of localities to implement human rights standards as they see fit, a terrible
mistake. However, the locality's rights can only go so far as they stay within the broad
boundaries established by the structural level.

"The ways in which these rights are

implemented," Donnelly says, "so long as they fall within the range of variation

consistent with the overarching concept (emphasis added), are matters of legitimate
variation. n20
The balance between the structural and the local has the advantage of balancing the
powers of both parties to the advantage of all. The structural prescribes universals such
as justice, freedom of self-government and choice of religions and speech, while at the
same time protecting humankind from universally accepted evils such as torture,
genocide and rape (just to name a few), in very broad strokes. It is the purpose of the
local, the varied societies and cultures of the world, to apply these universals into the
context of their daily lives. The level by which each society inculcates the idea of justice
will vary, and this variation is acceptable so long as the universal tenet of 'justice" is not
completely violated. It is important to note that all universal rights have limits (the term
universal should not be interchangeable with "absolute), and that no one right is the
absolute end-all. Even in liberal Western societies you cannot yell "Fire!" in a crowded
theatre21 nor declare on an airplane that you have a bomb. This is because our society has

19
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21

Donnelly (2003): 84.
ibid p. 97.
ibid p. 95
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put Jimit on the freedom of speech, though I doubt any would declare that this limit is a
8

violation of the universal right to that freedom.
As it were, this balance reduces the tension of the universalist-relativist debate because

the power to maximally protect the human rights of all people is the responsibility of both
forces equally. Neither side is more or less responsible because an attempt by either level
to supercede the other would result in action taken by the opposing level to reconstitute
equilibrium. The role of international human rights law then, is to assure this equilibrium
through international treaties, humanitarian intervention or, in the worst case situation,
military intervention to assure that local leaders respect the role of universal human rights

in the lives of their citizenry.
My theory can be presented in a very simple graph, as shown below:

Culture

A

Culture

8

Culture

c
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In the graph, each circle represents any particular human society. While tlu-ee are

shoWD. the number of circles can extend from 1 (assuming one world culture) to a-1 ,
(assuming every cultural, societal, economic, religious or otherwise division is
represented by a circle). While all three groups have a great deal that does not overlap in
tenns of cultural norms, there are some instances when overlap most definitely does

occur.
The structural level of human rights, the level on which universality is applied, is
identified as the area of the diagram where all three groups (as a representation of all
It represents the minimal universal rights

cultures present) overlap and are shaded.

demanded of all human groups. The local level of human rights is the entirety of the
unshaded region. This is each human group's attempt to interpret and institute these
universal precepts into their groups. As you can see there will be some overlap even
amongst the localities. Some values found in Asian societies, for example, are also
present in African societies. But each groups holds autonomy to do this interpretation for
themselves while still maintaining the universality also present in their group.

7.

Cultural Relativism and its Problems
Earlier I discussed the problems associated with the concept of universal human rights.

I will take a moment to discuss the problems with cultural relativism, and why it cannot

be accepted as a viable solution to the human rights debate.
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ManY theorists who advocate cultural relativism insist that "It is not clear... that anti. . , 22
roundationalism leads to re1atlvtsm.

Such a claim is absurd in that anti-

(oundationalism would, by definition, put the power to determine what human rights are

in the hands of each society or culture. As I said before, a tip towards the local level
would only work to unbalance and hinder the ultimate goal of human rights for all
humans. Donnelly presents several reasons why cultural relativism has maintained a firm
grasp on the human rights debate despite the advent of more universalist tendencies of the
past half-century.

Part of the problem lies in industrial society' s myopia and stubbornness when it comes
to Western (and in particular American) exceptionalism:

Americans, in particular, seem to have unusually great difficulty in
realizing that the way we do things here is not necessarily what
international human rights norms require .. .narrow-millded and hambanded (Western, and especially American) international human rights
policies and statements exacerbate these confusions.23
Americans in general seem to have always had issues with accepting international
human rights norms as their own. Recent examples, such as the desire for exceptions for
U.S. Armed Forces in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of
Justice elucidate this point.
Further, the legacy of colonialism is another explanation for the popularity of relativism

in non-Western cultures. With the fall of empires and the end to colonialism coming only
22
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~the last century, many in African, Asian, Muslim and Latin American nations still

remember the sting of colonial rule. Even when universal human rights is put in terms of
internationally agreed upon documents like the UDHR, there is still the fear of
subjugation (and rightfully so) under any body whatsoever after centuries of subjugation
by European powers, even if that subjugation is under the auspices of international law. 24
Arguments of cultural relativism are often rooted in nationalistic endevours.

The

"Asian values" debate (discussed in further detail later) was never more vehement than
during the advent of the Asian economic miracle, a time when Asian nationalism was at
its peak.

With the downturn of the Asian economy in the late-1990s, this debate

drastically subsided. 25
Finally, perhaps the biggest pitfall of cultural relativism is that it is political correctness
gone awry. Cultural relativism is a form of solipsistic suicide; if we say that we cannot
make judgements on other cultures because "that's how they do things," we are removing
ourselves from the necessary role of being critically judgmental of those things we know
to be morally and ethically unacceptable. It is deceitful for cultural relativism to claim
that it is through the supremacy of cultural and social values over those considered
universal that true tolerance and acceptance of human rights for all will occur. Rather,
what results is a duplicitous tolerance that doesn't address hate and intolerance that is the
primary suppression of international human rights. The attitude of "you do your thing
and I'll do my thing" does not address the issue of the existence of human rights; it
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doesn't even address the relevance of international human rights, but sidesteps it in an
effort to be "PC."
Finally, and most disturbing, cultural relativism is the defense used by tyrants. By
claiming that no universal can supercede the rights of their culture, they can do
practically anything they want and chalk it up to "cultural norms." This obviously must

be unacceptable and indefensible.

Strong cultural relativism cannot work because it

would be submitting to the arbitrary will of the Kabilas, Milosevics, Pinochets, Maos and
Husseins of the world. As Michael Ignatieff says, "Relativism is the invariable alibi of
tyranny. There is no reason to apologize for the moral individualism at the heart of
human rights discourse ... "

8.

26

Structural analysis- Universal and Traditional Notions of Human Rights

As I said before, the existence of universal human rights precepts is dependent on the

existence of a structural level of human rights, a conceptual level that is the foundation to
all discourses of what human rights are. The main attack on this idea is that ''universal
human rights" are simply ''European human rights" inflicted on the world as a form of
neo-Imperialism.

But as I have discussed earlier, universal human rights are not a

creation of the West, but an aspect of human nature that has always existed; liberal
culture was simply the first to recognize it on an international scale.
But doesn' t the conception of human rights by traditional societies rival that of
contemporary liberal society?

Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab insist that "all

26

societies cross-culturally and historically manifest conceptions of human rights.'m
should the concepts of human rights present be the foundation for the local level of
human rights in these traditional societies?
1 believe not. While I would not presuppose that the contemporary manifestations of
these societies are devoid of human rights concepts28 , in these traditional societies, the
sources of human rights legitimacy are varied, but none present the source of human
rights as being human itself like the contemporary liberal manifestation does.

In

traditional societies, the concepts of human rights often dismiss whole groups as not
having rights, or as having rights only through the mercy of another. Oftentimes peoples
within the societies are segregated and garnered differing levels of human rights
protection. In contrast, the contemporary liberal concept of human rights is superior to
traditionalist conceptions in that it is universal in nature. As the structural level of human
rights is universal, its single prerequisite need only be that we are all humans.
TRADITIONALIST ISLAMIC HUMAN RIGHTS

Abdul a'la Mawdudi bares the standard argument for Islamic human rights when he
says that "Islam has laid down some universal fundamental rights for humanity as a
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whole, which are to be observed and respected under all circumsntaces ... fundamental
.
. ,29
rights for every man by virtue
ofhis status as a human bemg.
Despite the claim, that it is a valid claim to the existence of traditionalist Islamic human
rights is nearly entirely groundless. Instead, most Islamic law is based around the idea of
duty. For example, where scriptural passages speak of a "right to protection of life," they
refer to divine commands not to kill. When they speak of 'justice," they refer to the duty
of leaders to establish this justice. When they speak of "right to freedom" they speak of a
duty to not enslave unjustly (not even to simply not enslave).

Economic rights are

obligations to help the needy, while freedom of expression rights are simply a duty of the
rights-holder to speak the truth.30
Virtually every example put forth by Islamic theorists for the existence of a traditional
Islamic view ofhuman rights are actually calls to duty from the divine to treat other with
respect and dignity. There are no rights involved; only obligation to Muslim religious
law. This is a far cry from contemporary liberal human rights, which makes no appeal to
divine commands. Indeed, according to Majid Khadduri, "human rights in Islam are the
privilege of Allah, because authority ultimately belongs to Him. " 3 1 The fourteen human
rights proposed by Khalid Ishaque are not rights but rather duties all good Muslims must
abide by.32 Even the word "Islam" means "submission to the will of God."
Finally, traditionalist Islamic concepts of human rights cannot be described as universal
because of their contingency on many factors. The nine basic precepts of an Islamic
29
30
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political system that Abdul Aziz Said lists involve either rights-less duties or are duties
held because one has a certain legal or spiritual status, not simply because on is a human
being. 33 For Khadduri, "Human rights in Islam, as prescribed by the divine law, are the
privilege only of person of full legal status. A person with full legal capacity is a living
bwnan being of mature age, free and of Moslem faith. "

34

More recently, Mahmood

Monshipouri stated that individuals have human rights only through "their relationship

with God.'.J5 Human rights, therefore, are the possession of free adult practicing male
Muslims. Non-Muslims are guaranteed the right to life and freedom of religion, but have
no actual rights. Slaves have even fewer guarantees, and Islamic women "are placed
squarely in a relation of subordination, the latter [women] to the former [men]." 36
The preponderance of evidence suggests that while Islamic theorists insist a notion of
human rights is present in traditional Islamic society, in actuality what they refer to is a
set of duties that all practicing Muslims must abide by. What rights might be present are
shared only by a portion of the population; the rest remain as inferior or, worse, in
subjugation.

TRADITIONALIST AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS

Traditionalist African societies have a unique view of what can be considered human
rights, but inevitably they prove to be symptoms of other things. When Dunston Wai
says that "Traditional African attitudes, beliefs, institutions and experiences sustained the
32
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view that certain rights should be upheld against alleged necessities of state37 , " ' he is
confusing human rights with limited government.

As Donnelly astutely points out

''There are many other bases on which a government might be limited, including divine
commandment, legal rights, and extralegal checks such as a balance of power or the
threat of popular revolt . .. having a right to limited government does not mean that one
recognizes or has human rights. "
African societies

39

,

38

Other texts enumerate rights held by traditional

but these rights are based on the merits of being human but rather on

requisites such as age, sex, lineage, achievement or community membership.
Kwasi Wiredu, the preeminent African philosopher in the United States, defines
numerous rights that existed in his native society, the Akans of northwest Africa. Many
of these rights, however, are contingent on status or are not rights at all, but needs. 40 He
speaks of the right to be nursed, saying of childbirth, "This is the time when there is the
greatest need for the care and protection of others and also ... the time of the greatest right
to that help .. .The right to be nursed, then, is the first human right."41 He also equates the
right to land as "an Akan person' s most cherished positive right.'.42 While he equates
these to rights "that people have simply because they are human beings,'.43 these are in
fact needs to be fulfilled, and not rights. As stated earlier, needs are physical: the need
for foo~ shelter or clothing. To mix needs (empirical) and "rights" (metaphysical) is
36
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dangerous, especially when you cannot produce a complete list of all the needs of the
human person.
While Wiredu defines other rights, including political participation, the right to a trial
and freedoms of thought and religion, these are all contingent on a human being being a
''person." In Akan society, person hood is an acquired notion, gained through age,
successful procreation and the rearing of a family.

To become a person (onipa in

Akanian language) is to become an official member of society; to not achieve person
hood meant treatment as a second class citizen.

While all individuals are humans

(because each has an okra, a minute piece of the Almighty), it is only through person
hood that legitimacy and freedom are achieved. Person hood is not available for children,
who effectively have no rights until they have proven themselves in the community.
Adults who never prove themselves are treated humanely but never receive the benefits
of personhood given to others by the community.
Traditional African cultures are much like traditional Muslim cultures in that they
ascribe to possess a system of rights where no such system exists. Where rights are
given, they are given to adult members of the society or to specific members, such as

onipas in Akan society. Traditional African societies exhibit a strong tendency towards
communitarianism, and inasmuch tend to identify those with rights as participating
members of the society. All those deemed as not worthy of citizenship in the community
have diminished rights; those outside the community have none at all.
TRADITfONALIST INDIAN HUMAN RIGHTS

43
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India is in the unique situation of having many authors from within the society argue

that, even up through the Cold War, human rights did not exist in traditional Indian
cultures. 44 Still, many writers do argue for the presence of human rights in traditional
Hindu societies.

As Yougrindra Khushalani states, "Hindu civilization had a well-

developed system which guaranteed both civil and political as well as the economic,
social and cultural rights of the human being. ,,4s Commenting on the caste system,
India' s complex social hierarchy, Ralph Buultjens says the caste is India's "traditional,
multidimensional view of human rights."46
The caste system rigidly divides society, determining from birth a person' s roles and
duties. While declared illegal, the caste system still holds merit in many rural areas of the
Indian subcontinent. There is little argument, even amongst Indian thinkers, that the
caste system is by no means a multidimensional view of human rights. If we are to
believe in the "inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family," as the UDHR and other human rights covenants state, then the caste
system is almost antithetical to the idea of human rights. As Dipankar Gupta admits,
"The principle criterion on which the caste system is based is the principal of natural
superiority.'.47 This natural superiority is most noticeable in regards to the Chandalas, or
"untouchables," a class not even given human status in many areas of India. Beteille

I

noted that, in a count of a village's population, the Chandalas were not even counted.48
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TRADITIONAL CONFUCIAN HUMAN RIGHTS

The issue of Asian values takes one a paired consideration. For one, we have to speak
about traditionalist Confucian society, but almost must address the claim by authoritarian
regimes in East Asia that human rights in their society have no correlation with "Western
conceptions" ofhuman rights.
In traditional Confucianism "the traditional code of ethics recognized each individual' s

right to personal dignity and worth, but this right was not considered innate within each
human soul as in the West, but had to be acquired by his living up to the code."49 To
consider this evidence of Confucian human rights is a misnomer. If dignity and worth in
Confucian culture is something you need to earn, then it is something you can lose; not
only were they not inalienable and innate, but they were dependent on following a man
made set of rules.
Political participation in Confucian societies ''was not to protect the individual against
the state but to enable the individual to function more effectively to strengthen the
state." 50 While strengthening of the state is important in terms of international relations,
when discussing human rights the preceding seems out of place. Lo Chung-Sho declares
that while English translators couldn't find a Chinese equivalent for the term rights, he
insists "this of course does not mean that the Chinese never claimed human rights or
enjoyed the basic rights of man." 51 That human rights could exist in a culture where the
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idea of human rights is not even hermeneutically expressible is illogical and bizarre.
While individuals (namely, Confucian civil servants) had the power to dethrone a cruel
ruler, supreme authority was given by the people to a benevolent ruler, who had a
"Mandate from Heaven" to ensure harmony.

In this sense, similar to in Islamic or

African traditional societies, if rights did exist they were conditional and given to human
beings by an outside force; human rights are most certainly not an innate nor inalienable
part of the metaphysical fiber of all members of traditional Confucian society.
"ASIAN VALUES" AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The phenomenon of "Asian values" that swept the world from the 1970s to the 1990s
has been impressive in its scope. Just decades after being a primarily agricultural region,
East Asian nations, including Malaysia, Singapore and China, began to assert claims to a
society where the human rights norms of the international system were inapplicable to
their nations. Regional leaders like Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia and Lee Kwan
Yew of Singapore rose to international prominence for their defiance of accepted human
rights norms in exchange for what they termed "Asian values."
While I believe it positive that Asian societies are choosing implementation and
interpretation that best reflects their rapidly changing society, what's troubling is their
marginalization of human rights in the name of rapid development. For example, Asian
thinkers claim that infringements on human rights are necessary to ensure that the basic
needs of the people are fulfilled. While this argument may be justifiable in the short
term, to restrain rights indefinitely in the name of development is a dangerous trade-off.
Former Chinese president Jiang Zemin argues that ''the right of survival of China's
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population is more important than political rights."52 Again, while a restrain of human
rights for a temporary time may be acceptable (though such restraints should not become
habit, nor should they last for very long), to give up these rights to merely survive is
incompatible.

If President Zemin equates "rights" to picayune survival he is quite

mistaken. Human dignity demands the best possible existence that a state can assure its
citizens.

In Japan, for example, the citizenry was only minimally affected by the

economic fallout of the 1990s because of an immense and well developed social welfare
system. That China, a nation experiencing robust growth, can do no more for their
citizens than assure their survival is troubling.
Also troubling is the Asian assault on individual rights to assure the harmony of society
as a whole. Severe misconceptions about Western liberal society precipitate from Asian
cultures, including the idea that "governments... cannot act against the personal wishes of
the individual.. .incest to them is not wrong .. .if that is what is desired by the
individual" 53 from Prime Minister bin Mohamed and that "The expansion of the right of
the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly
society,"54 from Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew would lead anyone to believe that
individual freedom has overrun Western society. However, such exaggerations are far
from the truth. While we do have extraordinary individual freedoms when compared to
much of human history, this right is not absolute. Laws assure that incest does not occur
and violate the universal right to human dignity of the victim. As mentioned before,
while we have freedom of speech, this freedom is impeded when it comes to declaring
52
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you have a bomb on an airplane. Freedom of association is not extended to gangs and
mobs. To use such radical exaggerations to justify one's own authoritarian rule is in bad
faith. The idea that the rights of the state would precede the rights of individuals is
completely antithetical to any concept of human rights.

To put state rights before

individual rights is "roughly the equivalent of having no rights at all. And a society in
which self must always be categorically subordinated to other simply cannot be
considered ' civilized' in the twenty-first century." 55
The advancement of "Asian values" over the past three decades has been an incredible
phenomenon in the human rights debate.

Whereas it took the "developed world" a

century to become an international economic force, the nations of East Asia achieved this
status in thirty years. The question is, at what cost? The suspension of the structurally
universal rights of speech, freedom of expression and association and political
participation Gust to name a few) in the name of economic expansion is acceptable, but
only in the most dire of consequences, and only where it is done in moderation. It is not
the place of contemporary liberal society to make demands on how East Asian societies
implement and interpret these freedoms; nor is it our place to denounce the temporary
curbing of human rights if the end goal is an advancement of human dignity for the
populace and, of course, a reinstitution of these rights. But where the suppression of
rights continues despite economic boom and growth into a world economic power, as it
has in East Asia, no claim of unique "Asian" values can change that the universal human
rights of the people are being restrained (an injustice in need of repair).
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The Role of Law in Human Rights

I will speak briefly on the role of international law and international bodies in assuring
the sanctity of structural and Local human rights. Because human rights are inherent and
inalienable to all humankind, law is not the source of rights. Instead, it is through law
that human rights are protected. As I hinted earlier, the role of international law is to
maintain equilibrium of the structural and local levels of human rights.
When the structural level looks to supercede the local level, there are reasonable
options, the best of which is for the world community, or regional authorities, to convene
and sign an international treaty to maintain the importance of local custom and culture. 56
When the local level seeks to supercede the structural level, 57 the world community has
several options. The most diplomatic option is to sign an international treaty condemning
the action, as exemplified by such universal treaties (by universal I mean treaties signed
by the vast majority of the world community) as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966, 141 countries), The Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (1979, 163 countries) and the Convention on the Rights
ofthe Child (1989, 191 countries). 58 Where treaties are inadequate, direct humanitarian
aid to end the human rights abuses occurring is another option.

This option was

exercised by the United Nations in Somalia in the early 1990s until the tragic downing of
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U.S. Black Hawk helicopters that led to the withdrawal of all foreign soldiers aiding in
the distribution of food and water and assuring the safety of the Somalis. Finally, where
00

other option is accessible, the option to incite military force on the violators of human

rights is an acceptable and viable option. When Serbian military forces threatened the
safety of Muslim Kosovars in 1999, NATO forces unleashed a fierce air campaign to
dissuade Serbian forces from advancing.

10.

Conclusion -All Is Not Lost

Despite the debate on what entails human rights, the existence of universal rights or the
correct balance between universality and relativism, everyone for whose arguments I
used or contradicted share a common bond. We all believe in the sanctity of human life,
and so we must tum to human rights to quell the atrocities of men against men and raise
human existence to a level of dignity not found in human history.
And yet I still maintain the importance of my theories in this debate in order to solve
the problems of human rights implementation. While it is important that the myriad
societies and cultures of the world maintain that which makes them unique (as they are
the chosen customs and social structures of the people within them), it is equally
important that universal human rights be recognized by the world community.

The

equilibrium of structural and local human rights will assure the dignity of all people
worldwide while assuring that culture and custom are secured.
Because, in the end, there must be a sense of solidarity amongst all humankind. In his
Letter from Birmingham Jail, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. said, "Injustice anywhere is a
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threat to justice everywhere." This feeling of injustice must come whenever we hear of a
fellow human being dying unjustly or whenever the human rights of a fellow human
being are obstructed. In 1797, Joseph de Maistre said
I have met in my life French Italians, Russians, etc.; I even know thanks
to Montesquieu, that one can be Persian; but nowhere have I met in my
life the man; if he does exist, this is without my knowing. 59
De Maistre viewed human beings not as one group but rather as many small groups
organized by national identity.

We must release ourselves from this image of

humankind. All people at all times share a common anthropological bond. Despite our
disparate cultures and languages, our disparate customs, our disparate societies, we all
can learn from our past. We all apply what we have learned in an attempt to make our
futures better. We are not shocked and disgusted by the Holocaust because the Nazis
killed Jews or Poles or Russians. Similar feelings do not arise because the Khmer Rouge
killed Cambodians, nor do we feel that way because Hutus killed Tutsis. Rather, we feel
sickness because it is in the most horrendous acts of men against men that we realize the
solidarity all rights bearing human beings share. It must be our mission to feel this
solidarity everyday; we must think of our neighbors not as "they," but as "us."
Richard Rorty says
The right way to take the slogan "We have obligations to human beings
simply as such" is as a means of reminding ourselves to keep trying to
expand our sense of ''us" as far as we can.
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That slogan urges us to

As

extrapolate further in the direction set by certain events in the past - the
inclusion among "us" of the family in the next cave, then of the tribe
across the river, then of the tribal confederation beyound the mountains,
then of the unbelievers beyond the seas (and perhaps last of all, of the
menials who, all this time have been doing our dirty work.).60
It is only through a realization that we are all in this game together that universal

human rights may succeed in ending human misery.
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Appendix I:
UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly resolution 217 A (lli) of 10 Dec.
1948:

PREAMBLE
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts
which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort,
to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by
the rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between
nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the
equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the
United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance ofhuman
rights and fundamental freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest
importance for the full realization ofthis pledge,
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society,
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both
among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories
under their jurisdiction.

Article 1.
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.

Article 2.
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
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or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore,
no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international
status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Article 3.
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Article 4.
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be
prohibited in all their forms.
Article 5.
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.
Article 6.
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
Article 7.
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8.
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10.
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any
criminal charge against him.
Article 11.
(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence bas the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has bad all the guarantees
necessary for his defence.
(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.
Article 12.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
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Article 13.
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to
his country.

Article 14.
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from
non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.
Article 15.
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
Article 16.
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal
rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending
spouses.
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society. and is entitled to
protection by society and the State.
Article 17.
(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18.
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and fi"eedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19.
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20.
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
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Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government ofhis country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedures.

Article 22.
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance
with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23.
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring
for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented,
if necessary, by other means of social protection.
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests.
Article 24.
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working
hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25.
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing ofhimselfand ofhis family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children,
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26.
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and
to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious
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groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of
peace.
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to
their children.
Article 27.
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life ofthe community,
to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
Article 28.
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.
Article 29.
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development ofhis personality is possible.
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.
Article 30.
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
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